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Abstract 
In this work, we describe a security solution that can be used to securely establish mobile payment transactions over the Near-
Field Communication (NFC) radio interface. The proposed solution is very lightweight one; it uses symmetric cryptographic 
primitives on devices having memory and CPU resources limitations. We show that our approach maintains the security of NFC 
communications and we further demonstrate that our solution is simple, scalable, cost-effective, and incurs minimal 
computational processing overheads. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a rapid emergence of mobile/wireless access and applications/services 
that have fueled the explosive growth in the number of mobile’s users. Wireless communication technologies are 
paving the way for the development of innovative, interactive and smarter applications and architectures. 
Nevertheless, many of the emerging wireless services are prone to unauthorized access and eavesdropping are easier 
as compared to wired communication technologies because a) wireless data is transmitted over the air and usually 
there is no physical controls over the boundaries of transmissions1, b) security features designed for wireless 
communications are sometimes poor, and c) attackers don’t have to tap into the network (i.e., due the broadcast 
nature of radio propagation) to insert rogue wireless access points, increasing the potential for unauthorized access 
to the transmission2. 
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In this paper, we study the security of mobile payment systems that are based on short-range wireless 
communication technologies. In particular, we focus on Near-Field Communication (NFC)3 that enables contactless 
transactions and messages’ exchange between two devices at the range of few centimeters. In the NFC 
communication architecture, a range of devices such as smartphones can implement the NFC standard. The devices 
can be in active or passive modes. When in active mode, both devices can generate a Radio Frequency (RF) field 
and start data exchange (role of Initiator), and when in passive mode (e.g., tag or contactless card), only the active 
device can initiate communication sessions and the role of the passive device is called a target (e.g., ticket counter, 
code bar, etc.). NFC devices can operate in three modes: reader/writer (an active device communicates with a 
passive device), peer-to-peer (active devices communicate with passive or active devices) and optional card 
emulation modes (device emulates a passive element, such as a contactless card4). 
NFC-enabled mobile devices allow a wide range of applications including, but not limited to, mobile contactless 
payment, mobile ticketing, information exchange, and access control. NFC-enabled devices and contactless Point-
of-Sales (PoS) terminals execute payment transactions using communication protocols that are based on Radio-
Frequency IDentification (RFID) standards such as ISO/IEC 144433. 
Figure 1 shows the case of a mobile device that integrates with the NFC technology. This device is typically 
composed of various integrated circuits, an NFC interface and Secure Elements (SE). The communications between 
NFC devices are enabled over the NFC interface. This interface is composed of an NFC Contactless Front-end, an 
NFC antenna and an NFC controller. NFC-enabled devices incorporate SE to a) securely store confidential 
information such as user account information, and b) to connect to the NFC controller to perform secure proximity 
transactions with external NFC devices. The Single Wire Protocol (SWP) 5 is used as an interface between the SE 
and the NFC controller enabling the communications between the payment application installed on the SE and the 
contactless readers (e.g., POS) through the NFC interface. The host controller is the part of the NFC system that 
processes exchanged data and establishes connections between the NFC controller and the SE. The NFC controller 
is connected to the host controller through the Host Controller Interface (HCI), which is also used for the 
communication between the NFC controller and SEs over the SWP interface. The UICC uses the ISO 7816 Interface 
to exchange data to a remote server in the Network. This interface includes a set of Data Packet called Application 
Protocol Data Unit (APDU) 6 for reading, writing and exchanging data between the host and the UICC card.  
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Fig. 1. Architecture of NFC-enabled mobile phone with UICC as a Secure Element. 
The lower layers of NFC does not support link-level security primitives7 which allows unscrupulous attackers to 
exploit vulnerabilities of eavesdropping and intercepting the data as discussed later or even having the device taken 
over completely by the attackers. Moreover, there are also concerns related to the privacy of the users because third 
parties are able to determine the current activities of the consumer and learn about user’s behavior. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some approaches that have been recently 
proposed to protect the NFC-based mobile payments. In Section 3, we review the security issues of the NFC 
technology and we show its vulnerability to multiple attacks. Section 4 describe the design of our proposed solution 
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to secure NFC communications. In Section 5 we discuss the security and performance of our solution. Finally, our 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
2. Related works 
NFC mobile payments involve collaborations between mobile phone manufacturers and OS vendors (e.g., 
Google), mobile phone operators, and banking organizations (e.g., VISA)3. When used for mobile contactless 
payment, NFC-enabled devices incorporate SEs to securely store private information. Using NFC in the form of a 
credit card means that someone could forgo credit cards altogether and instead make payments using mobile devices 
or smartphones8. In the case of mobile payments, the user holds or taps the phone close to the merchant’s reader8 to 
start sending his or her account information to the contactless PoS reader through RF link. The traditional payment 
and settlement processes are the same used by the mobile payment applications. 
Authors of9 indicated that all payment applications are protected from a network adversary via the use of 
Transport Layer Security (TLS)10. In11, the authors proposed the use of Elliptic Curve-based signature to sign 
exchanged NFC data and therefore to protect it against several attacks such as manipulation and to provide integrity 
and authenticity to NFC exchanged messages. In12, the authors propose a tiny TLS stack embedded in SE, which 
securely runs the mobile payment application. In13, the authors describes a certificate-based solution for enabling the 
client to send signed messages. The authors introduce the use of X.509 short lived certificates on the client side to 
eliminate the cost related to the certificate validation and to the communication and computational operations.  
The aforementioned solutions use a certificate-based authentication method to authenticate the SE and the PoS. 
However, using certificates impose an undesirable constraints on SE embedded in the mobile devices, which often 
have memory and battery-life limitations. Moreover, some other major limitations will influence the deployment and 
performance of NFC communications such as the processing time required to achieve the public-key cryptographic 
operations. More discussions on the issues of using certificates in wireless networks can be found in14. 
2.1. Contributions to this work 
Despite the fact that NFC is a short-range radio technology, NFC is still susceptible to several threats and 
vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we a) identify the threats and 
vulnerabilities of the air interface between NFC-enabled devices and the PoS, b) propose a solution to secure NFC-
based payment transactions with Smartphones and c) compare our solution to the solution presented in12. 
3. NFC Security Issues: Vulnerabilities and Attacks 
Despite the various applications that can be operated using NFC technology, the fact that the lower layers of NFC 
include no communication security primitives makes this technology susceptible to a wide range of vulnerabilities 
and attacks18. In this paper, the customer and the devices are assumed to be trusted; we focus on the security 
concerns related to the transactions over the NFC radio interface (Fig. 1). We note that different other vectors are 
possible for attacking the NFC. This mainly includes 1) malicious application installed on the NFC-enabled devices 
instead of the legitimate application such as malware applications9, 2) side channels over shared hardware 
components such as smart cards to extract or overwrite the secret and financial information stored into the cards, and 
3) malicious Operating Systems where the attacker can gain privileged access to the device and then exploit 
vulnerabilities15. In16, the authors discuss some threats for smartphones such as data leakage, unintentional 
disclosure of data, attacks on decommissioned devices, surveillance attacks and financial malware attacks. Existing 
solutions16, 17 can be used to mitigate the aforementioned issues. 
The NFC tags could contain malicious threats in a way similar to Internet browsers and malicious URLs. For 
example, one can spoof the content of NFC tags or replace the original tags to redirect users to the attacker website, 
initiate phone calls, send Short Messages (SMS), and surreptitiously install malicious code (e.g., Worms and 
Viruses) on the NFC-enabled device without requiring user consent.  
An attacker can passively eavesdrop on the communication between the NFC-enabled devices without any 
manipulation or modification to the data being exchanged between the devices (Fig. 2). Since NFC data is conveyed 
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through radio transmission, and by itself, cannot be protected against eavesdropping, attackers can use an antenna to 
sniff data exchanged between NFC-enabled devices.  
 
Fig. 2. Attack vulnerabilities on NFC payment systems. 
Instead of being passive, an attacker can act as an active eavesdropper that is able to intercept and modify the 
data being exchanged between NFC devices and to inject new data (Fig. 2). Replay attacks are similar to a passive 
man-in-the-middle attach where the attacker records a valid NFC signal for later use. Relay attack could be installed 
to establish a bi-directional communication channel between two legitimate NFC-enabled devices in order to create 
a relay between two NFC-enabled devices or between a reader and a tag. 
The most efficient solution to make it more resilient to most of the above security issues is by the establishment 
of secure sessions over the NFC radio interface. 
4. Our Proposed Security Solution 
Cryptography is the main mechanism that should be used to protect sensitive payment applications and users’ 
account data. In the case of mobile payment ecosystem, the physical credit card is replaced with another element, in 
which the NFC-enabled mobile device emulates the card and stores the user’s data into a Secure Element. Data 
stored into the SE could be managed by third parties and multiple contactless applications can be stored and 
executed on the secure element.  
In14, we have introduced an extension to the TLS protocol in order to establish a secure session between the SE 
(e.g., SIM card) and the OTA server, in which case the mobile device is acting as a passive proxy. In the following 
sections, we describe our proposed solution which aims to prevent the security attacks that are related to the NFC 
interface. Our solution makes use of certificate-based authentication between a PoS and a trusted third party (TTP) 
(e.g., trusted service manager) and of shared-secret-based authentication between the third party and the NFC-
enabled device (Fig. 3). We assume that the secret key shared between the TTP and the mobile (i. e., SKTTP_SE) is 
securely stored into SE and that cryptographic computations are performed inside SE. We also assume that SE offers 
good tamper-resistant and that certain physical hardware and software protections are used to make it difficult to 
extract or modify private and secret information in SE. We assume either the mobile device or the PoS or both have 
Internet connection. When the user connects to PoS to perform a mobile payment, the PoS may or may not have an 
Internet connection. We explain our proposed solution in the case where the PoS has an Internet connection and in 
the case where it hasn’t an Internet connection. 
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Fig. 3. Shared-secret and certificate-based authentication in our proposed security solution. 
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4.1. Case 1: Our authentication solution when PoS has an Internet connection 
To mutually authenticate, the TTP, SE, and the PoS engage in our protocol as described below (Fig. 4). 
• Step 1: The SE sends the identity of the user and a random value to the PoS (i.e., RVSE, IDSE). 
• Step 2: The PoS generates a random value (RVPoS) and sends it to the TTP along with its certificate and the 
random value and the identifier received from SE (i.e., CertPoS, RVPoS, RVSE, IDSE). 
• Step 3: The TTP verifies the PoS certificate, generates a secret key SKPoS_SE. Then, the TTP computes a 
session_key by applying a PRF (Pseudo Random Function) on RVPoS, RVSE, IDSE and the XORing of 
SKTTP_SE and SKPoS_SE. Next, the TTP encrypts the concatenation of session_key and SKPoS_SE using the PoS 
public key (PubPoS) and sends the encrypted the result to the PoS (i.e., E). 
• Step 4: Upon receipt of E, the PoS decrypts it using its private key (PrPoS) by computing AsymD(E, PrPoS). 
Then, the PoS symmetrically encrypts the session_key using SKPoS_SE and sends the result (i.e., F) to SE. 
• Step 5: SE computes the session_key and then symmetrically decrypts F to obtain SKPoS_SE, which is used 
therefore to securely exchange data between the SE and the PoS. 
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Fig. 4. (a) Case 1; (b) Case 2. 
4.2. Case 2: Our authentication solution when PoS has no Internet connection 
To mutually authenticate, the TTP, SE, and the PoS engage in our protocol as described below (Fig. 4). 
• Step 1: The PoS sends its certificate and a random value to the SE (CertPoS, RVPoS). 
• Step 2: The SE generates a random value RVSE and a secret key SKPoS_SE and symmetrically encrypts the 
concatenation of RVSE, RVPoS, and SKPoS_SE, using SKTTP_SE. SE sends the encrypted value F along with its 
IDSE and CertPoS to TTP. 
• Step 3: TTP verifies the PoS certificate and then symmetrically decrypts F using SKSE_TTP. Then, the TTP 
encrypts the concatenation of SKPoS_SE and RVSE using the PoS public key (PubPoS) and sends E to SE. 
• Step 4: The SE forwards E to PoS. 
• Step 5: Upon receipt of E, the PoS asymmetrically decrypts it using its private key (PrPoS) by computing 
AsymD(E, PrPoS). Next, PoS symmetrically encrypts RVSE using SKPoS_SE and sends the encrypted value (i.e., 
G) to SE which symmetrically decrypts it and compares it for equality to the random value initially 
generated. If the two random values are equal, then the PoS is authenticated. 
 
Once the authentication is successful, both the SE and PoS compute an encryption key that is derived from 
SKPoS_SE in order to encrypt subsequent session traffic. 
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5. Evaluation and Analysis of our Solution 
In this section, we evaluate our proposed approach, in particular we demonstrate that it is resilient against the 
attacks previously discusses such as replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and known session-key attack. We 
later evaluate its performance and compare it with other proposed approaches. 
An attacker can impersonate a malicious PoS to a victim SE. Our solution is resilient against man-in-the-middle 
attacks described earlier since on the first hand, it is fairly very difficult for man-the-middle-attacks to decrypt the 
session_key being asymmetrically encrypted. On the second hand, our protocol provides a mutual authentication 
between SE and PoS and the TTP as well. The mutual authentication between SE and PoS is established by applying 
the PRF function associated with a key on data being exchanged between both the two entities. Hence, it is not be 
possible for man-in-the-middle attacks to falsify the exchanged messages without being detected.  
An attacker may record the data being exchanged between the different parties and save them for later use. 
However, it is useless for the attacker to use the recorded data, especially when using sequence numbers or random 
values that include timestamps to generate a fresh encryption key, in which the attacker needs to know the secret key 
to compute the same encryption key. 
As previously discussed, NFC by itself cannot protect against eavesdropping. However, eavesdropping can be 
avoided by encrypting exchanged data with an encryption key that is derived from the session_key as previously 
described. 
5.1. Performance Evaluation of our Solution 
We evaluate the performance of our solution and compare it with the proposed approaches in12. Our solution 
introduces the use of: 
• Symmetric encryption to mutually authentication the SE and the TTP.  
• Certificates to authenticate the PoS to the TTP. 
Our comparison focuses on evaluating the computational costs associated with encryption and decryption 
operations. The costs (on per device basis) are compared with12 in Table II (te/td, ts / tv, and tae / tad are respectively 
the symmetric encryption / decryption, signature / verification computing time, and asymmetric encryption / 
decryption computing time). It can be seen that our proposed scheme performs better by incurring lower 
computational costs. In fact, the asymmetric cryptographic operations are executed on either the PoS or the TTP, but 
not on the SE which has memory and CPU resources limitations.  
In order to establish a mutual authentication, our solution requires the SE to execute two symmetric encryption 
operations, whereas the solution in12 requires one certificate-based signature and verification, which are more 
expensive in term of computational cost. In general, symmetric encryption tends to be 1000 times19 faster than 
asymmetric encryption. 
Our solution can easily be extended to protect the identity protection from eavesdroppers. For this end, the SE 
and the TTP can implement an anonymous credential technique to remove any link between the current 
communication and the SE identity. In the case of 12, client identity protection is not possible without renegotiating a 
new TLS session.  However, renegotiating a new TLS session requires more asymmetric cryptographic 
computations which are the rate limiting step in TLS, and therefore, the renegotiation has negative performance 
consequences.  In fact, renegotiation requires another round of an asymmetric encryption/decryption, which means 
the double number of asymmetric en-/decryption operations for TLS Handshake message processing, for both server 
and client.  Moreover, renegotiation requires twice the number of messages and roundtrips than a single TLS 
handshake, thus significantly increasing the overall delay in the session setup. 
                         Table 2. Cryptographic Cost Comparison between our solution and12. 
Entity Our Solution case 1 Our Solution case 2 Solution in12 
SE 1te + 1tPRF 1te + 1td 1tPRF + 1tae + 1ts 
PoS 1te + 1tad 1te + 1tad 1tPRF + 1tad + 1tv 
TTP 1tv + 1tPRF + 1tae 1tv + 1td + 1tae NA 
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6. Conclusion 
NFC-based mobile payment systems have generated considerable interests in data security issues of NFC’s users. 
The security issues are mostly related to the fact that NFC specifications specify no communication security 
primitives and consequently the technology is susceptible to a wide range of vulnerabilities and attacks. In this 
context, we presented a security solution that enhances the security of NFC transactions as well as the privacy of 
users. We demonstrate that our solution is more efficient than existing solutions in terms of reducing communication 
and computational costs. We argue that our proposed design is suitable for resource-constrained devices such as the 
Security Elements being embedded into the NFC-enabled devices. Our future works consist of integrating our 
solution into TLS protocol using pre-shared secrets20, 21, 22. 
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